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Abstract
Since ancient times legal discourse has been of interest to both philosophers of language 
and lawyers. The paper seeks to reveal the interdisciplinary methods where language and 
law are intertwined. As a method of analysis, the author uses Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) as a linguistic tool to show the different power relationships, the pragmatic 
peculiarities, and syntactic complexities of the language of the law. The author aims to 
investigate how the question-answer sequences of a cross-examination reveal inequality, 
domination and control in the court proceedings. A methodological approach to CDA, 
sociocognitive approach (SCA) provides linguistic means to examine the examples in 
question. The paper reveals how power is expressed in language use by analyzing the 
presuppositions, implicatures, speech acts and turn-taking sequences. Moreover, the 
author adds information with regard to cross-examination as a discourse genre.
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1 Introduction
The underlying assumption of this paper is that language and law require an 
interdisciplinary approach to be investigated as a distinct discourse genre, i.e. 
legal discourse.
Law is most often considered as an oral activity: thus a good command of 
spoken language proves to be a necessary criterion to put a client’s case strongly 
before a judge.
Austin’s philosophical work (1962) on speech acts gave rise to many legal 
analyses which presumed a relation of an individual utterance to a formal system. 
Sociologists and discourse analysts approach legal discourse from different 
perspectives. They consider the differences in ideology, gender and social class 
and those between lawyer and client, which may result in power differences “in 
their relationships” (Wodak & Meyer 2008).
According to Kryk-Kastovsky (2006), the language of law has several 
pragmatic characteristics: fi rstly, the turn-taking system in court is similar to 
institutional settings. Lawyers initiate questioning, in contrast to everyday 
conversations, where both parties may ask questions and give answers. Secondly, 





legal discourse deals with the nature, functions and consequences of language 
use in negotiation of social order. Thirdly, counsels use various questioning 
forms and strategies, which are revealed in the control of discourse. The latter 
socio-pragmatic principle can be considered as the sign of power differences 
between the parties.
2 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)
CDA seems to be a fruitful method for showing the inherent properties of legal 
discourse. According to Wodak and Meyer (2008), CDA considers language as a 
social practice and the context of language use as an essential means for revealing 
the underlying reasons behind peoples’ activities. CDA understands discourses 
as forms of language taking part in organizing social life. CDA supports the need 
for interdisciplinary work to show how language works in organizing institutions 
and in exercising power. The focus in the perspective of CDA lies in the term 
‘critical’, which means that social theory should be aimed to critique society. 
CDA emphasizes the need for critical knowledge to emancipate humans from 
domination and control. CDA focuses on the ways discourse produces social 
inequalities and domination. In other words, “CDA aims to investigate critically 
social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimized, and so on, by 
language use (or in discourse)” (ibid.: 10). Power seems to be a central concept 
for CDA researchers. Many analyses attempt to reveal the language use of those 
in power, who are responsible for dominance and control.
CDA involves a wide spectrum of research strategies and theoretical 
backgrounds to prove its main assumptions. Among all, the SCA (sociocognitive 
approach), which is associated with the socio-psychological aspects of CDA, 
serves a sound basis for further analysis (ibid.: 26). SCA introduces the concept 
of mental representations of communicative situations. These models such as 
knowledge, attitudes and ideologies direct the pragmatic part of the discourse. 
Therefore, SCA uses the following linguistic markers in the analysis: implicit 
meanings such as presuppositions, implicatures, speech acts, turn-takings, and 
word order. 
3 Legal pragmatics
Kryk-Kastovsky (2006: 14) claims that pragmatic notions, such as 
presuppositions, implicatures, and speech acts can be found in legal discourse 
as well as in everyday conversations. Thus, the study of legal pragmatics is 
concerned with the linguists’ issues of pragmatic aspects of language use.
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Pragmatic presupposition is an implicit assumption about a belief relating to 
an utterance whose truth is taken for granted. In the legal context, presuppositions 
are important means in interrogating clients about hidden facts or the truth of the 
case. Shuy (1998: 15) claims that presuppositions intimidate the suspect who 
may think that the interrogator may have known about his guilt. 
Implicatures can be considered as the core concept of pragmatics. Grice 
(1989) makes a distinction between what is said by a speaker and what he/she 
implicates. According to Grice’s classifi cation, conversational implicature is 
based on the linguistic or non-linguistic context of the utterance, background 
knowledge and the assumptions that are evident to both speakers in the 
interaction. In this way, implicature is a pragmatic notion, which refers to what 
is suggested in an utterance. Legal discourse is peculiar from the perspective 
of pragmatics, as meanings have to be inferred from depositions, or witnesses’ 
answers. Implicatures can be considered as useful tools for both interrogators to 
fi nd out the truth and for witnesses to evade answers. According to Shuy (2004: 
11) the counsel can use inferencing strategies with the help of implicatures to 
reveal the ambiguities present in the deposition of the witness.
Speech acts are the most frequently occurring pragmatic notions in legal 
discourse. As to the type of speech acts, speakers in legal discourse perform 
various performative speech acts, such as declaratives, representatives, 
commissives, and expressives (Searle 1975). Legal language is interwoven 
by these performative acts because legal utterances mean acting, not only 
descriptions. Danet (1980) demonstrates that representatives commit the speaker 
to the truth of the proposition, while directives are “the most prominent in 
legislation that imposes obligations” (ibid.: 458).
Exercising power is apparent in courtroom settings, where asymmetrical 
relations feature witnesses and defendants. Analyzing court trial discourse, 
Atkinson and Drew (1979) show that court examinations involve only question 
and answer sequences in contrast to everyday conversations. The turns of the 
examination are prelocated in one direction only: thus the interrogated party must 
not interrogate the interrogator. The power distribution seems to be apparent in 
this context, representing the one-sided control of power exercised by the men 
of law. 
Interrogation in the legal context plays an essential role in pragmatics. Kryk-
Kastovsky (2006) claims following Danet’s (1980: 521) description that open-
ended questions have the least control, while wh-questions, and leading questions 
(yes-no questions) have maximal control over the answers of the witness in the 
interrogating process. If the latter question forms are used as declaratives, they 
presuppose the truth of the utterance.
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4 The trials of Rodney King: A chronology
The trials of Rodney King and the following riots captivated the whole world 
in the spring of 1991 and continued to provide evidence on power abuse, power, 
and racism not only for the world of courts, but also for the wider public for more 
than twenty years.
On March 3rd, 1991, King was pursued by Highway Patrol offi cers at speeds 
of over 110 mph. They attempted to arrest King when LAPD offi cers (Laurence 
Powell, Stacey Koon, Theodore Briseno, and Timothy Wind) intervened. King 
was beaten over fi fty times with metal batons and fi nally was taken to hospital. 
As videotapes on the events were revealed, the FBI opened an investigation of 
the case. On March 7th, Los Angeles Police Chief announced that the offi cers 
would be prosecuted. 
Following the district attorney’s announcement that he would seek indictments 
against the offi cers from the grand jury, on March 2nd 1992, the jury of ten 
whites, one Hispanic and one Filipino acquitted the offi cers of all charges. Two 
hours later, rioting began in Los Angeles. 
A new trial in 1993 began on the charge of violating the civil rights of Rodney 
King. The judge sentenced the offi cers to thirty months in a correctional camp. 
In 1994, a civil trial ended with a jury awarding no money in damages to 
King.
5  Pragmatic analysis of the cross-examination: The cross-examination 
process
The cross-examination phase in a trial is peculiar from the point of view of 
pragmatics. The prosecutor is allowed to suggest answers or put words in the 
witness mouth in order to reveal the truth. According to Wellman (1997: 66), the 
purpose of the “cross” is to persuade the jury of the witness’ bias and demonstrate 
the implausibility of the defendant’s testimony. Therefore, the prosecutor should 
apply various pragmatic techniques to force a confession from the witness.
5.1 Presuppositions
The prosecutor built the cross on accusations with the help of presuppositions. 
He wanted to prove contradiction between the verbal, superfi cial commitment 
and the factual acts of the offi cer (Koon). The cross-examination started with 
questioning the credibility of Koon.
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(1)   Prosecutor Alan Yochelson: And when you gave directions to the Los Angeles 
police offi cers there, you take responsibility for all their actions, correct? 
Witness Koon: Yes, sir I take responsibility for all the actions.
…
Prosecutor Yochelson: When can you shoot somebody under LAPD policy?
Witness Koon: When they are eminent threat to you.
The prosecutor’s presupposition is that Koon was not a responsible offi cer 
because he did not act according to the rules. King (the accused) was not a threat 
for him because he did not attack anybody. Koon’s use of conditional mood 
makes his statement hypothetical, unreal: thus the prosecutor’s presupposition 
has been proven.
(2)   Prosecutor Yochelson: And what was Mr. King doing here that lead you 
believe that he was going to kill you?
   Witness Koon: It was my belief that he was under the infl uence of PCP. If 
he had grabbed my offi cer, it would have been a death grip.
   Prosecutor Yochelson: He didn’t grab anybody during these events did he?
Witness Koon: No, sir he did not.
This presupposition brings a discredit on the whole case: Whatever Koon 
claims people may think that truth is unimportant for him.
5.2 Implicatures
Implicature as a core concept of pragmatics cannot be explained by a syntactic 
rule, but by conversational principles. As already mentioned, implicatures are 
means for prosecutors to fi nd out truth and for witnesses to evade answers. 
The prosecutor’s statement starts a dispute, therefore, it implicates an 
oppositional view of reality that exists in the testimony of the respondent. The 
prosecutor applies inferencing techniques (working out implicatures) to solve 
contradictions in the respondent’s answers. The inferencing technique is based 
on the prelocated turns of legal discourse. As the interrogator owns the means to 
direct talk, he can draw conclusions that can be the basis for moral inferences.
In their talk on MBT, offi cer Powell refers to a movie titled ‘Gorillas in 
the Mist’ as a similar situation and participants to the night of the crime. This 
implicature is worked out by inferencing techniques to demonstrate the witness’ 
bias. The prosecutor infers that the gorillas were African Americans in the movie.
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(3)   Prosecutor White: Now this incident that you are referring to, this last 
call, „right out of Gorillas in the Mist” – it involved a family of African 
Americans didn’t it?
  Powell: Yes, it did.
Now, the prosecutor wants to know if the witness made a comparison between 
the movie and the night events. The prosecutor makes it clear that the witness 
understands the word “gorilla” in its metaphorical sense referring to people.
(4)   Prosecutor White: Were there any gorillas round? 
  Powell: I didn’t see any.
The prosecutor’s inference is almost perfect. He has proven that offi cer 
Powell called the African Americans “gorillas” based on a movie.
At this point, the prosecutor moves forward to justify that Powell used 
excessive force because he did not consider King as a human being.
(5)   Prosecutor White: Alright, at any time during this evening did it 
through your mind this was not a human being that you were beating? 
Powell: No. 
Finally, Powell makes a confession revealing that the prosecutor follows the 
right track.
(6)   Prosecutor White: All right, he wasn’t an animal, was he?
  Powell: No sir. Just acting like one.
Despite the negation of the offi cer, the prosecutor was successful in detecting 
the truth. The witness considered King to be an animal and consequently treated 
like an animal.
The inferencing techniques used by the prosecutor made the witness reveal 
the truth.
5.3 Speech acts 
On cross-examination, the primary aim of attorney is to fi nd out the truth of 
the case the witness may not intend to reveal. Prosecutor-witness communication 
involves a slightly different set-up of speech acts compared to Searle’s (1975) 
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classifi cation (declarations, representatives, directives, expressives and 
commissives). The example includes one speech act only restricting the dialogue 
to representatives. 
Questioning by the attorney is often accusatory owing to the presuppositions 
based on the facts of the case. Accusations in the form of questions may 
take three types: declaratives, yes-no questions, and alternative questions. 
(Luchjenbroers 1997: 482). Declaratives as questions are powerful means to 
suggest the interrogator’s exact knowledge of the topic: thus these forms are 
close to representatives. There is no way for the respondent to evade or give a 
different answer.
(7)   Prosecutor Barnett: All right, and so you lost control of Mr. King at that point? 
Witness Briseno: Yes, sir. I thought Mr. King was under the infl uence of a 
…probably PCP.
The answers of the witness take the speech acts of the representatives which 
commit the speaker to the truth of the proposition.
(8)   Prosecutor Barnett: And March 3, 1991, what was your occupation? 
Witness Briseno: Los Angeles police offi cer. 
  Barnett: As of that date, how long had you been a Los Angeles police offi cer? 
  Witness Briseno: Nine years…
5.4 The sequential organization of the cross-examination
Kryk-Kastovsky (2006) claims that one of the principal characteristics of 
courtroom discourse lies in achieving certain goals. The counsel should be brief, 
intelligible, and essential in questioning the witness and should make the strongest 
point at the beginning and end of the cross. The counsel needs to ensure that he 
asks leading questions to keep control of the witness. Atkinson and Drew (1979: 
61) emphasize that the verbal exchange in court examination consists almost 
exclusively of question-answer exchanges in contrast to everyday interaction. 
The turn order is fi xed; turn allocation is initiated by the interrogator and repairs 
come from the interrogated. 
The asymmetrical power distribution is manifested in the turn-taking system 
of the dialogue. Only the counsels have the right to ask questions, the interrogated 
necessarily contribute answers. According to the analysis, some cases may 
contradict this principle, as demonstrated in the following excerpt:
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(9)   Prosecutor Terry White: While Mr. King was on the ground did you see any 
movements that you would describe at threatening .. to Offi cer Powell?
Witness Briseno: Which time? 
  Prosecutor White: During these second series of baton blows.
  Witness Briseno: No sir.
   Prosecutor White: Did you see any movements by Mr. King that could be 
defi ned as aggressive?
  Witness Briseno: No sir.
6 Conclusion
I hope to have come up with some illustrative evidence that the analysis of 
the pragmatic means used by the interlocutors and the sequential organization of 
the cross-examination contribute to detecting power exercised in legal settings. 
On the one hand, the fi xed turn order and the one-sided use of leading 
questions show the asymmetrical power distribution, on the other hand, the 
pragmatic tools, such as presuppositions, implicatures and speech acts are used 
to have the witness reveal the truth. Presuppositions may show the contradictory 
aspects of the deposition. Implicatures are powerful means for counsels to reveal 
the truth, and speech acts compel the witness to answer directly.
This fact, of course, does not mean that counsel-witness interaction is 
inevitably asymmetrical. As shown in the trial above, the witness may give witty 
replies or evade answers; therefore, the interaction is experiencing signifi cant 
shifts towards the empowerment of the counsel. Nevertheless the pragmatic 
means owned by the interrogator entitle him to use the coercive linguistic tools 
to show power proving the crime committed by the defendant.
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